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ABSTRACT
Computer crime is a large problem (CSI, 2004; Kabay, 2001a; Kabay, 2001b). Security
managers have a variety of tools at their disposal – firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs), encryption, authentication, and other hardware and software solutions to combat
computer crime. Many IDS variants exist which allow security managers and engineers to
identify attack network packets primarily through the use of signature detection; i.e., the IDS
recognizes attack packets due to their well-known “fingerprints” or signatures as those packets
cross the network’s gateway threshold. On the other hand, anomaly-based ID systems determine
what is normal traffic within a network and reports abnormal traffic behavior. This paper will
describe a methodology towards developing a more-robust Intrusion Detection System through
the use of data-mining techniques and anomaly detection. These data-mining techniques will
dynamically model what a normal network should look like and reduce the false positive and
false negative alarm rates in the process. We will use classification-tree techniques to accurately
predict probable attack sessions. Overall, our goal is to model network traffic into network
sessions and identify those network sessions that have a high-probability of being an attack and
can be labeled as a “suspect session.” Subsequently, we will use these techniques inclusive of
signature detection methods, as they will be used in concert with known signatures and patterns
in order to present a better model for detection and protection of networks and systems.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

One of the most pervasive issues in the computing world today is the problem of security
– how to protect computer networks and systems from intrusions, disruptions, and other
malicious activities from unwanted attackers (M. Bednarczyk, Guili, & J. Bednarczyk, 2005).
Many of the problems seen in today’s connected society are preventable; that is, the vast
majority of the system and network vulnerabilities that exist are known and preventable. RFC
2828, Internet Security Glossary, defines the terms threat and vulnerability (Shirey, 2000):
Threat – a potential danger that might exploit a vulnerability that can be either intentional
or accidental
Vulnerability – a flaw in a system’s design or implementation that can be exploited for
malicious gain

To combat these threats and mitigate the latent vulnerabilities, security standards and
protocols are developed to improve the security and confidentiality between computers and
peripherals while ensuring the intended traffic successfully gets to its destination.

Secure

Sockets Layer (SSL), Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure (HTTPS), Secure Shell (SSH), and
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) are just a few of the protocols and standards available for use
in the computer security field.
When the standards and protocols for today’s Internet were established in the 1960s and
1970s, not much attention was given towards developing security protocols and equipment.
Most of the work at that time was devoted to linking computers and local area networks together
1

over vast distances (Postel, 1977). Any introduction of security equipment at that juncture would
have inevitably reduced the effectiveness of any interconnectivity testing or implementation.
Over time, however, international standards committees like the International
Consultative Committee for Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT) realized that more emphasis
needed to be placed upon security services and standards. So, in 1991 the CCITT delineated the
security services that can be provided within the framework of the OSI Reference Model
(CCITT, 1991; Stallings, 2003):
1.

Authentication – ensuring that the computer entity is who they claim to be.

2.

Access Control – ensuring that unauthorized use of a particular resource (server,

router) is prevented.
3.

Data Confidentiality – ensuring that the data is not disclosed to unauthorized

personnel.
4.

Data Integrity – ensure that the data received is the same data sent by an

authorized person.
5.

Nonrepudiation – ensuring both the sending and receiving entities actually sent or

received that message.

1.1 A Historical Look at Computer Security Issues

Computer crime has been around for a long time. Whether as an intellectual exercise or
as a deliberate attack, hacking can cause much damage and havoc. Two major events – while

2

positive in nature – had some negative aspects to them as well: the creation of the predecessor of
the Internet – the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) (Postel, 1981a;
Smithsonian Institution Online, n.d.) and the creation of the World Wide Web (Berners-Lee,
1992), which runs on top of the Internet backbone network.
While both events were welcome additions to the realm of information dissemination,
they also were technologies that provided little in the way of information security and assurance.
In fact, most of the efforts surrounding these events concentrated in getting the information from
one computer to another; therefore, layers of security would have impeded those goals at that
time. As time went on and more users and companies were dependent upon the Internet and the
WWW, security issues became more important and less of a nuisance to network managers.

1.1.1 The 1980s and 1990s

1.1.1.1 Cuckoo’s Egg

More than a decade ago, Cliff Stoll wrote a book detailing his encounter with computer
espionage during the waning days of the Cold War (Stoll, 1989).

In “The Cuckoo's

Egg: Tracking a Spy through the Maze of Computer Espionage,” Stoll describes how a 75-cent
accounting error eventually led him to unravel a KGB-financed spy ring in West Germany that
cracked dozens of highly-sensitive computer networks in the United States.

3

Although the events in the book occurred in the late 1980s, the lessons learned are still
relevant today. Stoll points out that he used a rudimentary intrusion detection system (hard copy
printouts) and tracked the hacker across many computer systems. The text is a must-read as well
as the companion video from PBS NOVA (Stoll, 1990) that showcases the difficulty Stoll had
while tracking the hacker.

1.1.1.2 Internet Worm and Mitnick’s Attacks

Other high-profile attacks included the Morris Internet Worm in 1988 (GAO, 1989) and
Kevin Mitnick’s attacks and subsequent capture by authorities as described in Shimomura’s book
Takedown (Shimomura, 1995; Shimomura & Markoff, 1996). In a subsequent report on the
Morris worm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that the estimated cost
of the inadvertent attack was around $10 million and affected 6,000 computers (GAO, 1989b).
One positive outcome of this event was the creation of the Computer Emergency Response
Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) in 1988 (CERT/CC, 2005a).
The worm was preventable if systems administrators took proper steps to update and
patch their operating systems. After all, the Internet Worm exploited software bugs in unpatched
Unix operating systems and replicated rapidly to other accessible, non-patched (or poorlypatched) computer systems. The affected systems were eventually rendered useless as they were
overloaded with processing multiple copies of the worm program (CERT/CC, 2005a).

4

The tools have improved over the past fifteen years but the patience and dedication
required to track hackers have not changed. In 1998 I was part of an Army team that started a
ten-day network and systems security course for US Army military and civilian personnel at Fort
Gordon, Georgia. In that course the instructors describe and teach the tools needed to detect and
hopefully stop hackers. As an introductory piece, we use excerpts from the Stoll book to
underscore the need for accurate and complete network and systems security in any organization.

1.1.2 More Recent Malicious Events

More recent attacks include the so-called Love Letter worm (CERT/CC, 2000) (or,
ILOVEYOU virus) and the CodeRed worm (Symantec, 2001). Both attacks proved to be
damaging but ultimately manageable.
Other attacks like the SQL Slammer (Sapphire) (Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon,
Staniford,

&

Weaver,

2003),

SoBig.F

and

MyDoom

(MessageLabs,

2004),

and

W32.Blaster/W32.Nachi (MyCERT, 2005; Microsoft, 2003) all underscore the need for constant
vigilance and dedication on the part of systems administrators and security managers. In Figure
1.1 below (MyCERT, 2005), the damage to one network from the W32.Blaster and W32.Nachi
worms are shown:

5

Figure 1. 1. W32.Blaster/W32.Nachi Worms Statistics

The Sasser Worm (Microsoft, 2004a) is another, more-recent example of a destructive
application sent over the Internet.

Sasser exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the

Microsoft Local Security Authority Subsystem (LSASS) process and normally uses TCP port
445 on the victim’s computer (ISS, 2004). Unfortunately, millions of computer administrators
and users failed to patch their systems as Microsoft came out with a critical patch weeks before
the worm actually hit the Internet (Microsoft, 2004b).
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In an ironic twist to this story, the German teen who was charged and convicted of
releasing the Worm in May 2005 was given a job at Securepoint in Germany (BBC, 2004).
Recently the teen was convicted of computer sabotage and other crimes but since he confessed to
everything, was seventeen at the time of the worm’s release on May 1, 2004 and was remorseful,
he was given a suspended sentence despite affecting almost twenty million computer systems
worldwide and costing millions of dollars in lost data and productivity (DW-World, 2005).
Applying the latest operating system patches would have helped but newer attacks such
as simple variants to all of these attacks would be hard to stop due to their uniqueness. Firewalls
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can find known attacks by accessing their internal
signature databases when scanning for attacks; but, a never-seen-before attack may slip through
the protective devices unnoticed.

1.2 Security Issues of Today

In today’s hyper-connected world of computer networks, security is a constant concern.
As networks grow in size and complexity and computer services expand, vulnerabilities within
the local area and wide area networks become more numerous and problematic.
Since the explosion of the Internet’s usage, particularly with the introduction of the
World Wide Web in the mid-1990s, more research and development dollars have been spent
towards securing Internet data and transactions. However, much more needs to be done.

7

1.2.1 CSO Magazine Survey Results

CSO Magazine, in conjunction with the United States Secret Service and CarnegieMellon University’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), conducts an annual ECrime Watch Survey (2004) which surveys various corporations and other assorted
organizations; through the voluntary surveys, they discover trends and techniques of the
criminals and how best to combat those electronic criminal acts.
Some of the survey’s major findings are shown in Table 1.1:

Table 1. 1. E-Crime Survey Findings 2004
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Even more troubling than the information contained in the table above is the finding that
nearly one-third of those organizations surveyed who experienced an electronic crime (e-crime)
or intrusion did not know if it was an insider or an outsider who committed the particular ecrime. Well-run security organizations make it their business to know when and why breaches
and attempted breaches in their security happen.
Out of the seventy percent of the surveyed organizations that reported an e-crime or
intrusion, six types of crimes stand out amongst the rest – viruses; denial of service attacks
(DOS); spam; unauthorized access by insiders; phishing – the use of spoofed emails or websites
to fool users into divulging personal information (ISS, 2005); and, unauthorized access by
outsiders. The frequency table for these six types of reported crimes is shown in Table 1.2
(CSO, 2004):

Table 1. 2. Reported Frequency of Six E-Crimes
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To combat these troubling statistics, companies, government organizations, and other
entities must employ a variety of security solutions. Many employ a “defense in depth” strategy
that applies strict security measures across the spectrum of devices inside a company’s network –
routers, switches, servers, printers, desktop computers, etc. Therefore, if someone obtained root
privileges on a gateway router, the effects will be mitigated since they could not automatically
get access to anything else (Johnson, 2004).
The surveyed organizations reported a promising number of security solutions (hardware
and software) that have been installed at their locations. Table 1.3 describes those items –
firewalls; physical security devices; patches; encryption; access control; intrusion detection
systems; and other information assurance (IA) technologies:

Table 1. 3. Security Solutions Installed in Surveyed Companies (CSO, 2004)
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1.2.2 CERT/CC Statistics

The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) tracks these
issues and publishes various statistics regarding the state of security and security reporting within
the computer network community. Until 2003 the CERT/CC kept track of incidents reported to
them and those numbers are shown in Figure 1.2 below (CERT/CC, 2005c).
The average annual increase of reported incidents to the CERT/CC was 104% from 1997
to 2003. This annual doubling of reported incidents is troubling and probably will not diminish
in the near future.
With regards to Figure 1.2, emphasis should be placed on the word “reported.” Many
companies and governmental agencies are reluctant to report any security incidents for a variety
of reasons. Primarily, these entities are concerned with loss of company secrets, revenues and
profit (companies); loss of classified or sensitive information (government); and, loss of standing
in the public arena (both companies and governmental agencies).

Further, some security

managers and administrators may be reluctant to report incidents for fear of losing their jobs or
standing in their company (Symantec, 2005).
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Figure 1. 2. Reported Incidents (CERT/CC)

In 2004, CERT/CC decided to stop keeping track of reported incidents partly due to the
reasons stated in the previous paragraph. They also stated that proliferation of automated attack
tools have caused the number of attacks to skyrocket against networks connected to the Internet;
therefore, the CERT/CC felt that tracking the number of incidents would provide little helpful
information regarding the assessment of the scope and impact of attacks. We disagree with this
conclusion since automated attacks are still attacks against networks and tracking the number
and severity of these attacks would continue to provide useful information. However, we can
assume that the doubling of the number of reported attacks will continue and we must be
prepared to use any means to combat this ever-increasing trend (CERT/CC, 2005c).
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1.2.3 Trends and Attack Profiles

CERT/CC discussed the trends that they have seen in the changing profiles of most
intrusions. Back in 1988, most of the attacks centered on the exploitation of passwords as well
as the exploitation of known vulnerabilities. Today, however, the security managers have much
more than simple exploitation of passwords to worry about since the attacks are usually
contained in one of the following profiles (CERT/CC, 2005b):
•

Exploiting passwords

•

Exploiting known vulnerabilities

•

Exploiting protocol flaws

•

Examining source and executable files for new security flaws

•

Defacing web servers

•

Installing sniffer programs

•

IP source address spoofing

•

Denial of service attacks

•

Widespread, automated scanning of the Internet

•

Distributed attacks

•

Building large networks of compromised computers

•

Developing command and control networks to use compromised computers to
launch attacks
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While each of the twelve profiles raises concerns for security managers, many novel
attacks combine two or more of the profiles listed above in their overall attack schemes. For
example, an attacker could exploit a known vulnerability (profile #2), install a sniffer program
(profile #6) that scans the internal victim network for unprotected executable files, then exploits
those executable files that have new security flaws (profile #4) to create further problems for the
victim network.

1.3 Thesis Statement

The main goal of this research is to detect network intrusions by analyzing the network
traffic flow. The differences between our approach and traditional intrusion detection algorithms
are as follows:
First, our system is a two-tier system. The first tier is a traditional signature based system
that can be used to detect the known attacks. The second tier is a model-based system that can
recognize currently unknown attacks through a learning algorithm developed using known
attacks. A flag will be raised to catch the system administrator’s attention if any traffic that is
either significant deviated from normal network traffic pattern or has some similarities with
existing attacks.
Our research will lay a step ahead of the traditional methods since the damages already
have been done before any attack patterns can be known. The signature based system acts as a
first line of defense that will filter known intrusions based upon carefully crafted heuristic rules.
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The model driven rule based system will offer an added functionality where new rules can be
incorporated into the database.
Second, we will analyze session based network traffic instead of analyzing packet-based
traffic to increase the detection accuracy. This will consequently reduce the false alarm rate.
Our data mining system serves as the core engine to sift intrusion traffic from benign
ones. We will explore support decision trees for their proven capabilities in mining useful
patterns from a large corpus of data and learning through the extracted features. A dynamic
analysis of the control and data flow in the traffic will provide us the insight of the program
behavior that is avoided by a static examination.

15

CHAPTER 2: DATA MINING

Data Mining can best be described as an analytical process that sifts through a large set of
data and provides the researcher with patterns and relationships contained within the data itself.
From these patterns and relationships, the researcher can subsequently models to better
understand and predict any future data that comes into the pre-existing data set.
For our research, these data mining patterns could provide a better understanding of any
local area network (LAN). The problem with creating a model derived from these patterns is one
of utility: how can we use such a model on a live network?
Further, the issues of traffic ambiguity and vantage points present problems for the
accuracy of our network model (Dreger, Kreibach, Paxson, & Sommer, 2005; Ptacek &
Newsham, 1998). The modeling of a LAN’s traffic at selected choke points – like an Internet
gateway – will give us a large amount of network packets.
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2.1 Data Mining Basics

SAS Institute describes the process of data mining in an acronym – SEMMA – Sample,
Explore, Modify, Model, and Assess (SAS, n.d.). This acronym accurately describes the steps
we took to first sample the large amount of computer network traffic data in small pieces;
explore the data in more depth by finding relationships between variables; modify and transform
the data to meet our needs; model the entire data set; and, assess our model. Due to the
extremely large file sizes of the network data (some were in excess of 8GB), following the
SEMMA process helped us to properly dissect and analyze the data at the most-critical points.
Many other sources are available online and in book form that provide in-depth
information on basic and advanced data mining principles. In (2001) Han & Kamber cite seven
iterative steps needed to properly conduct knowledge discovery procedures, shown in the table
below.

Table 2. 1. Knowledge Discovery Steps

Step

Description

Notes
Inconsistent packets

Data Cleaning

Remove noise

removed – out of session
boundaries, e.g.
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Original data merged with
Data Integration

Combine several data sources
attack database
Iterative process where

Data Selection

Retrieve relevant data

most-needed variables are
used in data set
Create variables for sum,

Data Transformation

Modify data for mining
average, and other stats
Decision tree created to

Data Mining

Extract data patterns

show rules for finding
predictive attack patterns

Pattern Evaluation

Identify interesting patterns

Analyze attack patterns

Visualize mined patterns

N/A

Knowledge
Presentation

Out of these seven steps, only knowledge presentation (visualization techniques to
present mined knowledge) will not be discussed here in further detail.
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2.1.1 Data Cleaning, Selection, and Transformation

These three initial steps comprise of manipulating the data to remove noise,
inconsistencies, irrelevant data, and other non-essential elements. While somewhat tedious,
these steps are crucial in the early stages of knowledge gathering and any missteps can lead to
erroneous conclusions and models.
For the data cleaning and data selection tasks, data imputation and the use of global
constants can help fill in missing values. Further, techniques for data reduction – such as
discretization of values – assist the data miner by reducing the number of possible values in a
continuous variable.
Data transformation techniques (smoothing, aggregation and normalization, to name a
few) are critical operations that prepare the data for subsequent data mining analysis.

2.1.2 Data Mining and Pattern Evaluation

Generally, there are two types of data mining models – descriptive and predictive. While
descriptive models create meaningful subgroups or demographics within data sets, predictive
models create patterns that can be used to predict future values (Two Crows Corporation, 2005).
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These models will be useful for our research by allowing us to create models of how the network
should “look” and employing that knowledge at the network’s edge to augment current
signature-based IDS systems.
The most-common techniques used in data mining are shown below (Joshi, 2005):
1. Artificial neural networks: Models that resemble biological neural networks.
2. Decision trees: Tree-shaped structures that represent sets of decisions.
3. Genetic algorithms: Techniques that use processes such as genetic combination,
mutation, and natural selection.
4. Nearest neighbor: Techniques that classify each record in a dataset based on
similarity with nearest neighbor.
5. Rule induction: Techniques that extract pertinent if-then rules from data based on
statistical significance.
6. Data visualization: Models that visually interpret complex relationships in
multidimensional data.

In our research we will concentrate primarily on the decision tree technique used in data
mining.

These tree-shaped structures will assist our research by representing the sets of

decisions required to accurately portray normal network activity and thereby showing us a moreeffective way of finding potential attacks from an outside source.
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2.2 Data Mining Patterns

Within the Data Mining framework, there are five sets of patterns that exist that we can
strive to achieve and look at further (Han & Kamber, 2001):

Characterization and

Discrimination; Association; Clustering; Outliers; Evolution; and, Classification and Prediction.

2.2.1 Characterization and Discrimination

Data characterization allows us to summarize the general characteristics of a particular
subset of our data. The subset is usually retrieved by a database query, such as an SQL
statement. An example of data characterization would be describing – in a summary fashion –
all grocery customers who spent more than $1,000 dollars per year shopping in the grocery store.
The corresponding SQL statement follows:

SELECT

C.cid, C.amt

FROM

Customer C

GROUP BY C.cid
WHERE

C.amt > 1000
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Data discrimination, on the other hand, describes the process where two separate subsets
of the data are compared and contrasted in order to achieve the desired results. These results can
be expressed in the form of rules that are called discriminant rules. Additionally, when data
characterization and data discrimination processes are combined, we achieve even more
functionality.

2.2.2 Association

Association analysis allows us to discover attribute-value conditions within data subsets.
These conditions that we find by using association analysis occur together quite frequently and
give us association rules like (Han & Kamber, 2001):

age(X, “20..29”) AND income(X, “20K..29K”) Î buys(X, “CD player”)
[support = 2%, confidence = 60%]

The example rule above indicates that 2% (support) of the customers who are between
the ages of 20-29 and have an income of 20K to 29K have purchased a CD player at a particular
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store. Therefore, there is a 60% probability (confidence) that a customer in this demographic
will purchase a CD player.
Association Rule Mining allows us to discover interesting relationships among large data
sets. These relationships are expressed in rules that can assist businesses in decision-making
processes (i.e., market basket analysis). Additionally, association rules provide a good starting
point for network traffic analysis and we may explore using these rules in the future.

2.2.3 Clustering

Clustering analyzes data objects without using a known class label (Han & Kamber,
2001). These labels are not present in the training data set since they are not known in the
beginning; however, clustering can generate these labels if needed.
Clustering of data objects is grouped by maximizing the intraclass similarity while
minimizing the interclass similarity. In other words, clusters are formed where objects within a
particular cluster have a high degree of similarity with other objects in that cluster while also
having a low degree of similarity with objects in other clusters.
Clustering of network traffic information has great potential for our research. Chan,
Mahoney, & Arshad (2003) wrote extensively on this subject and developed a clustering
anomaly detection engine (CLAD).
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2.2.4 Outliers

Outlier analysis identifies objects within a data set that are abnormal and do not act
normally. These objects generally do not comport to the general overall behavior of the larger
data set.
While outlier analysis has limited uses, it has been used some; for example, credit card
companies use outlier analysis to detect fraudulent credit card activity where a criminal may be
using a stolen credit card to buy items that the legitimate user would not normally buy.

2.2.5 Evolution

Evolution analysis describes data regularities or trends whose objects’ behaviors change
over a certain length of time. An example of this would be predicting future stock market
performance by looking at market regularities over time as well as during certain times of the
year.
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2.2.6 Classification and Prediction

Classification is the process (Han & Kamber, 2001) where the data miner can build a
model from a training data set that will eventually describe data classes whose class label is
known. This model would be used to predict a class of objects whose class label is unknown
from a totally different data set.
Classification models can be shown as IF-THEN rules; decision trees; math formulae; or,
neural networks. In our research, classification models that produce decision trees and IF-THEN
rules will be extremely useful and beneficial for our end product.

2.3 A Decision Tree Analysis

Decision trees are readily applicable to large data sets such as the network traffic data set
used for our experiments. In order to explore our data, we used a decision tree data mining
technique that identified classification rules for an attack as “1” and a non-attack (normal traffic)
as “0”.
Safavian & Landgrebe (1991) discussed decision tree methodology and described the
possible positive and negative effects of using a decision tree classifier (DTC) over other
methods. They showed that DTCs are simple, flexible standards and can use a smaller number
of features at each node without degrading performance in the model. An example of a general
decision tree is shown in Figure 2.1 below:
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Figure 2. 1. Generic Decision Tree (Safavian & Landgrebe, 1991)

2.3.1 Decision Trees and Large Data Sets

One of the challenges seen when exploring a large data set is the issue of missing values.
To deal with missing values, we do not have to impute values because these models have built-in
mechanisms such as floating category approaches implemented by Enterprise Miner and the
surrogate method as seen in Classification and Regression Trees (CART). For our data set, there
are many missing values and imputation is a very difficult and time-consuming task.
Also, decision trees are among the most efficient methods for studying problems of this
nature. For example, other methods such as logistic regression cannot efficiently handle all
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variables under consideration. There are almost two dozen independent variables involved in our
research; all of them are multi-leveled. This means that the logistic regression model must
incorporate dozens of dummy variables and two-way interactions. Even with today’s computers
this process is very time consuming. On the other hand, the decision tree approach can perform
this analysis very efficiently, even if the investigator considers higher order interactions.
Further, decision-trees constitute an appropriate method for studying this problem
because many of the variables are ordinal in their scaling. Although we can assign numerical
values to each of these categories, assignment of values to each of these categories is not unique.
However, decision trees use the ordinal component of the variables to derive a solution analysis.
The rules found in decision trees have an IF-THEN structure that is readily
comprehendible. Also, the quality of these rules can be assessed with percentages of accurate
classification or odds-ratios that can be easily understood. The final procedure analysis produces
tree-like rule structures that predict outcomes. Customarily, researchers test the quality of the
rules on a data set independently of the one on which they were developed.

2.3.2 The Model Building Procedure

For this study, we used the classification and regression tree methods (Breiman,
Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984) executed with SAS Enterprise Miner (SAS, n.d.).
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Tree-based methods are recursive; bisecting data into disjoint subgroups called terminate
nodes or leaves. CART analysis incorporates three stages: data splitting, pruning methods, and
homogeneous assessment.
Data splitting into two (binary) subsets at each stage is the first feature of the model.
After splitting, the data in the subsets become more and more homogeneous. The tree continues
to split the data until the numbers in each subset are either very small (i.e. say the number of
observations is less than 100), or all observations in a subset belong to one category (e.g. all
observations in a subset have the same rating). Typically, this “Growing the Tree” stage results
in far too many terminate nodes for the model to be useful. The extreme case occurs when the
number of terminate nodes equals the number of observations. Such models are uninformative
because they produce very few rules with explanatory power.
The CART procedure solves this problem by using pruning methods that reduce the
dimensionality of the system. In practice, CART splits the data into two pieces—the first data
set grows the tree, and the second prunes the tree, thereby validating the model. In practice,
CART methods, through the pruning process, reduce the original tree into a nested set of sub
trees. Although homogeneousness based on the training data set can always be improved, it is
not necessarily true in the validation set. Typically, because the validation data are not used in
the growing process, they give an honest estimate of the best tree size.
The final stage of the analysis involves assessing homogeneousness in growing and
pruning the tree. One way to accomplish this is to compute the misclassification rates. For
example, with a rule that produces a .95 probability that an attack is present has an associated
error of 5.0%.
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An important feature of this approach involves a performance assessment of the finally
developed model—accomplished by the application of rules that have been developed and
validated initially to an independently collected data set.

2.3.3 Consequences of Using Decision Trees

Although decision tree techniques are effective for analyzing data sets such as those
considered in our research, there are consequences of this procedure. First, decision trees only
use ranks to handle both ordinal variables and interval variables. At times, this might lead to lost
distribution information about some variables, although the use of ranks does not create any
information lose in the analysis.
Second, decision tree algorithms will combine categories if a given category variable has
excessive partitions. For example, most decision trees algorithms will combine ZIP Codes into
several groups before applying split search. This feature, however, was not problematic in this
research because we used no categorical variable that had more than 10 categories.
Third, the most serious weakness of the decision trees is that the results can be unstable
because the technique is data driven and small variations can lead to substantially different final
solutions. Techniques such as boosting (Schapire, 1996) and bagging (Breiman, 1996) provide
some remedies to the instability of tree methodology. However, these treatments will make the
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interpretation of the rules much less intuitive countermanding the fact that ease of interpretation
is one of the most important advantages of decision tree modeling.

2.4 Data Mining In Our Research

For our research, the question remains: how do we use data mining tools in our research
and which technique from the list in section 2.1 should we use?
Initially, the decision-tree method will be used to gather as much data as possible.
Several unique models will be compared and contrasted against our score data set to see which
model provides the best anomaly detector and why.
A comparison of classification methods would become necessary and we will use the
following criteria to compare the methods. These methods are ranked in order of usefulness to
our research, from most useful to least useful:
1. Predictive Accuracy – ability to correctly model the class label of new data. In our
research, how accurate is the session-based IDS model when it predicts whether or not incoming
network traffic is anomalous?
2. Interpretability – level of understanding and insight provided by the model. In our
research, this is critical since the model’s insight will help us to better protect our networks
through different protective schema.
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3. Scalability – ability to make a model efficiently, given a large data set. In our
research, this is key since our data sets are extremely large (2 GB per day at least).
4. Speed – computational speed costs involved while (a) generating the model and (b)
using the model. In our case, a fairly strong computer system is needed to generate the model
monthly as well as using the model online to detect attacks.
5. Robustness – ability to make correct predictions given noisy data or data with missing
values. In our case, no missing values exist and not much data is considered noisy.

So, a combination of the decision tree and rule induction techniques will be used in our
research. The decision tree-based program segments the extremely large data sets (6 to 8
gigabytes each) well and creates a model that can be manually extracted and inserted into our
anomaly-based program. Although this process is labor-intensive, it needs to be accomplished
approximately once per month for a particular network. This will account for any changes in the
structure of the defending network that needs to be accounted for in the anomaly-based model.
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CHAPTER 3: INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

To mitigate the ever-present computer security issues, network and system security
managers have an array of protective measures – both hardware- and software-based measures –
which provide the basic tools for protecting the internal networks from outside influence. Secure
and safe transactions can be provided through the use of firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs), Intrusion Protections Systems (IPSs), encryption, authentication, and other hardware and
software solutions.
One of the main tools used by today’s security managers is the Intrusion Detection
System (IDS). The IDS provides a layer of security by “watching over” the network at key
points and alerting the network manager of any malevolent traffic that enters or leaves the
network. IDSs come in two flavors – network-based IDS and host-based IDS. While the latter
concentrates on securing individual servers and clients, the former works at a much larger scale
to actually secure the gateway from the internal network to the outside Internet.

3.1 Network Intrusion Detection Systems

Network Intrusion Detection Systems usually have multiple sensors (the eyes and ears of
the program) that remotely watch over the network and monitor all connections. These sensors
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report back to the main program and the suspicious events are logged and acted upon if
necessary.
While much time and effort have been given towards improving firewalls, encryption,
passwords, and securing operating systems, research into effective Intrusion Detection Systems
has been uneven and concentrating mostly on misuse detection instead of anomaly detection.

3.2 Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detection

Many IDS variants exist which allow security managers and engineers to identify attack
network packets primarily through the use of signature detection; i.e., the IDS recognizes attack
packets due to their well-known “fingerprints” or signatures as those packets cross the network’s
gateway threshold. On the other hand, anomaly-based ID systems determine what is normal
traffic within a network and reports abnormal traffic behavior (Axelsson, 2000).
Misuse detectors use traditional Intrusion Detection System technology where known
attacks are catalogued in their internal databases and immediately recognized by the IDS when
its known signature pattern is seen. The problem with misuse detection is that attack signatures
can be altered easily and thereby “sneak in under the radar” of the misuse detection systems. On
the other hand, anomaly detectors look at the network from a more macro point of view and
concentrate on how a “normal” network should look like during the workday.
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The downside

with most anomaly detection techniques is the high number of false positive alerts that are
usually seen in these systems.

3.3 Why IDS Programs are Needed

Sundaram (1996) described the need for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) along with
the two major types of IDS devices – Anomaly Detectors and Misuse Detectors. Anomaly
detectors determine what is “normal” in a particular system or network and if an abnormal or
anomalous event occurs, then it is flagged for further inspection. Misuse detectors are similar to
modern anti-virus systems where an attack’s signature is stored in the IDS for later use if needed.
However, both types have their advantages and disadvantages, but the future seems to lie within
the anomaly detectors’ area of concern.
Sundaram continued his introduction by describing the problems with IDS – false
negatives and false positives. False negatives are the situation when intrusive activities that are
not anomalous result in a flagged event. False positives occur when anomalous activities that are
not intrusive are flagged as intrusive.
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3.4 Anomaly Detectors of Today

Liston (2005) and Phung (2000) describe the limitations of current signature-based ID
systems. Both authors recognize that using data mining tools to support anomaly detection
projects are critical for the overall advancement of ID systems.
Two sub-types of anomaly detection are statistical approaches and predictive pattern
generation. The former method uses a detector that constantly generates the variance of the
present profile from the original one while the latter method or sub-type tries to predict future
events based on the events that have already occurred.

3.4.1 CLAD and LERAD

Chan, Mahoney, and Arshad (2003) discussed how signature detection (“misuse
detection” in the previous reference) could not detect novel attacks. Therefore, they contended
that it is better to focus on anomaly detection techniques in the IDS field to model normal
behavior in order to detect these novel attacks. The authors described two methods for learning
anomaly detectors: rule learning (LERAD) and clustering (CLAD).
Both methods – CLAD and LERAD – present interesting advantages and possibilities for
future research. One example of a learned rule’s semantics under LERAD is the probability
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(“P”) where P(DestPort = 80 | SrcIP = 128.1.1.3, DestIP = 128.4.5.6). Here, we see that their
models are predictive in nature so that false alarms are less likely to occur.
Finally, the authors described a proposed data-mining algorithm that has five main steps
that aid in their research:
1. Generate candidate rules from the random data sample
2. Evaluate those candidate rules
3. Select a minimal set of candidate rules that covers the random data sample
4. Train the selected candidate rules on the training data set
5. Prune the rules that cause false alarms on the validation data set

3.4.2 EFSA

Sekar, Gupta, Frullo, Shanbhag, Tiwari, Yang, et. al, (2002) discussed anomaly detection
based intrusion detection techniques and described a new approach to fix the main problem
anomaly detection – high rates of false alarms.
They developed extended finite state automata (EFSA) to simulate the network’s normal
operation and determined that their state machine fairly accurately portrayed the training data
sets. They used automated learning tools to map out the network behavioral patterns to become
transitions in the state diagram.
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3.4.3 Distributed Data Mining and Database Mining

Bala, Baik, Hadjarian, Gogia, and Manthome (2002) looked at distributed data mining
approaches to build global profiles by applying tree induction procedures. Eventually, they
generated classification rules that led them to build partial and final trees to show a pattern-based
profile of the host network.
Hu and Panda (2004) proposed a data mining process and associated algorithm to detect
malicious transactions in a database system.

After two initialization steps, their algorithm

generated sequential patterns from the transactional data based on the patterns recognized in the
data. They conducted several experiments with their algorithm and found that they could
effectively discover malicious activity within the database provided that certain data
dependencies existed.

3.4.4 IDEVAL

Mahoney and Chan (2003) discussed the DARPA/MIT Lincoln Laboratory data set offline evaluation (IDEVAL) (Lippmann, Haines, Fried, Korba, & Das, 2000), which covered many
of the then-popular attacks against Windows NT and Unix hosts in 1999. Mahoney and Chan
analyzed the popular network traffic benchmark and suggested that the presence of simulation
artifacts can lead to “overoptimistic evaluation of network anomaly detection systems.”
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Simulation artifacts contain three conditions or attributes: well behaved in a simulation
environment without attacks; poorly behaved in a real environment without attacks; and, poorly
behaved in traffic containing simulated attacks. While the authors contend that these artifacts
can cause misevaluations of anomaly detection systems, we contend that we can mitigate this
problem by dynamically modeling networks continuously and tailoring our model to fit the
network that requires an anomaly detection system.
Lee, Stolfo, and Mok (1999) proposed using association rules and frequent episodes
found in network auditing data as the basis for guiding the data gathering and feature selection
process.

They also proposed using meta-learning in order to make the IDS models more

adaptive and more effective.
The authors discussed the different types of detection systems available, as well as their
advantages and disadvantages. Then, they described the use of association rules and frequent
episodes programs. They further described data mining concepts of support and confidence,
which allows the data miner to determine the viability of a given rule that is used at a particular
point in time with a given level of confidence. They used these concepts against a variety of
datasets, with excellent results.

3.4.5 Statistical Analysis on Network Packets

Bykova, Ostermann, & Tjaden (2001) described a statistical-based methodology in the
analysis of network packet characteristics. Like the other papers that talk about the use of
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statistical or data mining procedures to find anomalous traffic, the authors show that their
research can analyze attack packets and create rules based around the characteristics of the
packets that come before and after the intentionally-malformed packets.
While useful, this type of research does not directly affect our network anomaly research.
While we consider the attack packets and their surrounding packets, we do not create models that
simulate specific attack signature patterns. However, we do create models for our research that
simulate normal network traffic and any anomalous traffic will get separated and inspected later
in the process.
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CHAPTER 4: SESSION-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION

The complexities in the field of modeling and simulations can be enormous. Floyd and
Paxson (1997; 2001) described the inherent difficulties of simulating the Internet and networks
in general. The heterogeneity of the Internet and networks makes it a difficult task to model
those entities; however, if we properly choose the vantage point where our information is
extracted, we can show that the model for that particular point is advantageous for our research.
While the choice of a network vantage point for data collection is crucial, the issue of
modeling specifications also comes into play. How a model should be created and choosing the
correct data from the network packets are key points in our research. We concentrated on using
the data obtained from network packet headers but only use a certain number of fields. We then
converted the packets into sessions for improved results.
The variable selection was conducted initially through trial and error but eventually
evolved into intuitive matching of certain features with other like features. For example, we
chose to concatenate the source IP address with the source port number. We concatenated the
same variables on the destination side of things. Further, we combined temporal variables like
date, hour, minutes, seconds, and milliseconds and converted those variables to have a nominal
value since their numeric values mean little from one day to the next. Finally, we added
housekeeping variables like numPKTS that showed the number of packets in the selected session
we were examining.
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4.1 Packet-Based IDS System
Mahoney and Chan (2001) described their Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD)
system that discovers the value ranges of packet header fields for data link (layer 2), network
(layer 3), and transport (layer 4) layers of the traditional seven-layer Open System
Interconnection (OSI) networking model as described in ISO 7498 (ACM, 1994). Figure 4.1
shows the OSI reference model. Further, PHAD does not look at application (layer 7) protocols
like DNS, HTTP, or SMTP, so its scope is limited as are most anomaly-based engines.

Figure 4. 1. OSI Reference Model
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While we start off by using network packets, our research expands on programs like the
PHAD system and collapses the packets into sessions. These sessions – while not pure and true
TCP data sessions – represent a leap forward in anomaly-based detection since they provide a
new way at looking at network traffic and modeling of the network traffic at key vantage points.

4.2 Session-Based IDS Tools

For this research, we used a 2.4 GHz Pentium IV computer (single processor) running
Windows XP with 528MB of RAM with an 80GB internal hard drive and a 160GB external hard
drive. Also, several software packages were used to expedite processing of the data and for the
creation of the model itself: Editcap, Snort, Cap2Txt2, and SAS® Enterprise Miner™. In the
near future, we will work to export most of these model-creation processes to a Java- or C-based
program; however, we will conduct that exportation process as follow-on work to this
dissertation.

4.2.1 Tcpdump and Editcap

Tcpdump is a program that is used to capture packets in the background while the
network interface card (NIC) is in promiscuous mode instead of its normal broadcast mode
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(Hegde, 2005).

When saved, the captured packets are stored in a binary format termed,

“tcpdump format.”
For MS Windows systems, Snort and Ethereal are more widely used packet capture
programs than Tcpdump; however, the underlying libpcap packet capture library still supports
those programs as well as Tcpdump. Both Snort and Ethereal (Combs, n.d.) are open source
programs as well.
Editcap is a command line program that works with Ethereal (Networkdictionary.com,
2005); editcap takes a saved capture file as its input and then writes some or all of the packets
into another capture file (Orebaugh, 2004). We used this program to take the original Tcpdumpformatted file and slice the file up into smaller files, each containing 100 thousand packets. This
allowed us to process the data faster as our Java program could not handle resulting text files
with much more than 100 thousand packets.

4.2.2 Snort IDS Freeware

Snort is a lightweight, Network Intrusion Detection freeware software package (Roesch,
1999). Although it is open source and readily available for anyone to use, it is also a highly
regarded IDS system in use today.
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From its inception in 1998, Snort has evolved from a niche program to a solid NID
system that is capable enough to handle real-time traffic and the analysis of protocols (Carlson,
2005).
Snort is customizable and the open-source nature of Snort allows users to mold the
program to fit their individual needs. Further, registered Snort users can modify and update the
online signature rules database to highlight a newly found attack signature or simply to match
their needs (Vossen, 2005).
For this research we used Snort in two distinct ways. First, we used Snort to simply take
the output from the editcap routine and pipe it to a text file. Second, we used Snort to analyze
the entire October 2004 training data set and tag the packets that were attacks or probable
attacks.
A key point in our research is that we assume that Snort’s current rule set – which is
currently six months younger than the training data set – will find the vast majority of attacks in
the training and validation data sets. After all, any new attacks (i.e., new attacks as of October
2004) will be identified and tagged by the Snort user community. So, modeling the October
2004 data in June 2005 should present very few errors and misfires.
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4.2.3 Cap2Txt2 Java Program

To finish off the initial processing of the data, I created a Java program – cap2txt2 – that
processes the text-based network packet data and formats the data further for exportation into the
SAS® Enterprise Miner™ program. This program goes through each packet, line by line, and
subsequently formats the data properly. Malformed packets will be ignored and discarded.
In the future, this Java program will form the basis for the overall SAND program (see
section 4.5). While the core of the modeling activity will still occur within SAS® Enterprise
Miner™, most of the formatting, editing, and other preprocessing tasks will be done online
within the SAND program itself. We envision that editcap, tcpdump, and most of the SAS Code
modules will become obsolete, as SAND will take up most of those tasks. This project should
occur within the next year or so, outside the scope of this dissertation.

4.2.4 SAS® 9.1 Enterprise Miner ™ 4.3

In version 4.3 of SAS® Enterprise Miner™, we used the SEMMA process as described
in chapter 2 to properly analyze our flood of network data. Several steps in this process – most
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notably, explore, modify, and assess – were repeated several times to get better results as well as
to verify the results themselves.
SAS® Enterprise Miner™ is a solid data mining software suite that allowed us to create a
model in the form of a decision tree and subsequently extract the vital rules inside that decision
tree. These rules were then exported into a SAS code program, which we ran in order to create a
new data set that told us which sessions were probable attacks and which were not probable
attacks. The overall SAS model is shown in the figure below.
We chose to use SAS for our research for several reasons – ease of use; accuracy of
decision-tree models; and, flexibility with large data sets on Windows-based platforms. Other
similar tools like Classification and Regression Trees (CART) could have been used but SAS
met our needs best. Future research should include other data mining software products in order
to analyze and compare the results generated. Like any other software program, SAS is simply a
tool to help validate our theories.
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Figure 4. 2. SAS Enterprise Miner Model of our Data

Most of the modules shown above simply act as placeholders for the code we created to
handle the data better and more efficiently. The modules without any arrows are SAS code
modules used for this purpose. Although SAS is touted as a Windows-supported program, most
of the power of the data-mining environment in SAS is derived from the user creating code in the
SAS modules.
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4.3 Research Methodology
We started our research towards developing a robust network modeler through the use of
data-mining techniques using the well-known MIT Lincoln Lab data sets from their work in
1999. The MIT researchers created a synthetic network environment test bed to create their data
sets (Haines, Rossey, & Lippmann, 2001).
These contrived data sets – which contained both attack-filled and attack-free data –
allowed us to look at network traffic stored in tcpdump format where the attack types, duration,
and times were known and published.
When looking at the data sets, the individual rows represent network packets while the
columns represent the associated variables found in that particular network packet. The figure
below (Allen, 2003) shows a sample of the types of TCP traffic that occurred in the synthetic test
bed.
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Figure 4. 3. Average TCP Connections Per Day (non-attack weeks)

We started off looking primarily at the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) header information. Based on earlier work in the 1970s and 1980 (Postel, 1977; Postel
1980), these two protocols form the basis for most Internet traffic today. While the original
Internet Protocol specified a security option (Postel, 1981a), this option determined the labeling
and routing of a message and provided little in the way of current security standards and
practices.
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4.3.1 Data Preparation

Figure 4.4 shows the TCP segment information that we used in our research with the first
20 bytes being the header information of the TCP segment, as specified in RFC 793 (Postel,
1981b). Using data mining techniques on the individual packets’ data set, we were able to
estimate an importance value for each of the fields prior to our final modeling attempts with the
Lincoln Lab data set. Further, we decided that additional information like IP addresses, which
are important for security managers to know and use for later inspection, are not important for
our research since we do not need to worry about where the packets start or finish, just what is
contained in them.

Figure 4. 4. TCP Segment (Postel, 1981b; Leon-Garcia & Widjaja, 2004)
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4.3.1.1 Target Variable

From there, we studied the data sets’ patterns and modeled the traffic patterns around a
generated target variable, “TGT”. This variable is a Boolean value (true/false) where a true
value is returned for TGT if the packet is a known attack packet as designated by the studies
done in the Lincoln Labs’ tests. We used this variable as a predictor target variable for setting
the stage when we applied a new, separate data set to the model and subsequently scored that
new data set against our model.
Other TCP header information like Sequence Number offsets – which are important
factors when considering what hackers look for when attacking networks (Northcutt, Cooper,
Fearnow, & Frederick, 2001) – were not found to be important factors in our research.

4.3.1.2 Shaping and Collapsing the Data

Eventually, we shaped the data set to become “wider” and “shorter”; i.e., we added more
variables (columns) and reduced the number of observations (rows).

To achieve this we

collapsed the data set through the use of Structure Query Language (SQL) constructs to mesh the
associated packets into sessions, thereby reducing the size and complexity of the data while
maintaining the essential components of the data set.
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Since the responding (i.e., victim) computer was involved in an attack session, its sending
“TGT” value was reset to “1” to describe that it’s receiving an attack from an outside source.
The original test data set went from 12.5 million observations (rows) to 61,000 observations. A
visual diagram of this action is shown in Figure 4.5 below:

Figure 4. 5. Data Collapsing
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4.3.2 Classification Tree Modeling

We used a predictive, classification tree method for our model. This technique allowed
us to determine which categorical variables where pertinent to our ability to accurately predict
the attack sessions in our network.
The advantage with using this method over traditional pattern-recognition methods is that
the classification tree is an intuitive tool and relatively easy to interpret. When classifying
network sessions from its predictive categorical variables, the resulting hierarchical tree
produced two major types of sessions – probable attacks and non-probable attacks (see section
4.5).

4.3.3 Data Modeling and Assessment

We strived to accomplish our data-mining goals through the use of supervised learning
techniques on the binary target variable, “TGT”. We also used the concept of over-sampling,
which allowed us to highlight the infrequent and unusual attacks that occurred during the 1999
IDEVAL. From the initial data set we over-sampled the labeled attack sessions and created a
new data set that contained a mix of 43.6% attack sessions and 56.4% non-attack sessions.
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4.3.3.1 Variable Deletion

From this mixture we further deleted a few extraneous variables – date/time, source IP
address, and destination IP address variables.
All other header variables were kept, including the source and destination port numbers,
in order to allow the system to model the important facets of the network better.

4.3.3.2 Model Creation

We then partitioned the data using stratified random sampling and allocated 67% of the
observations (network sessions) to the training data set and 33% to the validation data set. The
TGT variable was then specified to form subsets of the original data to improve the classification
precision of our model.
We created a decision tree using the Chi-Square splitting criteria and modeled the data
from the IDEVAL. Our decision tree model determined that the number of leaves required to
maximize the “profit” of the model was around four or five leaves.
Our model also shows that after five leaves of depth, the tree maximizes its profit and
further calculations past that point would prove extraneous for our studies. Further, the statistics
from our model show a low misclassification rate and average squared error, which indicate
stability. Our model’s fit statistics are shown below:
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Table 4. 1. Model’s Fit Statistics

4.4 Assessment of Risk
Once employed in a network security framework, this system of anomaly detection
would prove invaluable to the network security managers and administrators. However, one
potential problem area is the introduction of new technologies into a network, since traffic from
these technologies would be tagged as anomalous from our anomaly-based filter.
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Further, as Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa (2002) show in their Risk Management
Guide for IT Systems, the IT security practitioners must use the risk management process
continuously to identify and resolve news risks when any of the following events occur:
1.

Expansion in network connectivity

2.

Changes to the existing infrastructure

3.

Changes to the existing organizational policies

4.

Introduction of new technologies

The authors later described the nine risk assessment steps required, shown below. After
the first step is completed, steps 2, 3, 4, and 6 can be accomplished in parallel.
1. System Characterization
2. Threat Identification
3. Vulnerability Identification
4. Control Analysis
5. Likelihood Determination
6. Impact Analysis
7. Risk Determination
8. Control Recommendations
9.

Results Documentation
The risk assessment methodology flowchart for these nine steps is shown in Figures 4.6

and 4.8.
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Figure 4. 6. Steps 1-4 of Risk Assessment (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002)
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The first four steps shown above entail getting the problem identified properly. That is,
the security personnel must determine if and when there was an authorized access of data, for
example, and what exactly is the threat that the victim network encountered.
From there, they describe the remaining five steps of the risk assessment model (shown
below) and show that the security personnel must continue to assess and re-assess the impact of
the break-in and steps that need to be taken immediately.
All nine steps are qualitative in nature. However, steps 5, 6, and 7 have a quantitative
aspect to them. In these steps, the security personnel are asked to evaluate the level motivation
of the threat against the security controls that are in place (step 5 – “likelihood”) as well as to
evaluate the impact of a particular vulnerability being exploited (step 6 – “impact”). From there
an impact vs. likelihood matrix is created (step 7) in order to show the level of risk that is being
assessed. Figure 4.7 shows an example of this matrix.
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Figure 4. 7. Level of Risk Assessed Matrix (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002)

They finish with long-term outputs – Recommended Controls and Risk Assessment
Reports – that detail the steps that need to be taken to ensure the network is stronger, healthier,
and more resistant to these types of attacks in the future.
The inputs received from steps 1 to 7 provide valuable data and insight for the security
managers to take action upon. The resulting report and recommended controls are passed along
to senior managers who undertake a risk mitigation strategy that is designed to limit risk until it
gets to manageable and acceptable levels. Getting their risk down to or close to zero is probably
impossible. At best, it’s probably nearly impossible and too cost prohibitive. So, the senior
managers use the risk mitigation steps to reduce the risk into “residual risk” that is acceptable.
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4.4.1 New Technologies’ Impact

We saw this problem of new technologies causing false IDS alarms early in our research
when we analyzed the traffic (packet by packet) and noticed that DHCP, SSH, and secure FTP
packets in the UCF data set caused alarms in our model since our training data set (IDEVAL)
contained no instances of any of those protocols.
To counter this threat, constant updates are required for each network’s model as the
network managers add new protocols and equipment to the network. Additionally, our research
shows that each network should have its own unique model to filter out and identify anomalous
behavior properly.

4.4.2 Low Level Attacks’ Effect

An additional risk comes from the possibility of low-level attacks that evade detection
from some IDS systems. The packets from these attacks appear so infrequently that they are
regarded as noise in the network; however, our anomaly filter may be able to detect these attacks
and future research will look into this risk to see if this threat is manageable or not.
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4.4.3 Two Levels

A further extension of our research would be the inclusion of signature-based detection
working in conjunction with our anomaly-based detection system. Future work would include a
proposed system where network sessions from the outside wide area network (WAN)
environment pass through two sets of filters before reaching the internal local area network
(LAN).
This setup would potentially solve many of the problems anticipated with the anomalybased system, but one new problem would arise with this two-tiered framework: denial of
service (DOS) attacks. A malicious outside user could determine that flooding these network
devices with millions of attack packets would cause a successful DOS attack by forcing the
filters to examine each packet and session individually, thereby allowing the system to
eventually stall and go off-line to correct the problems.
The Tribal Flood Network (TFN) Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks in 1999
were an example of these types of attacks. TFN is made up of several programs that can flood
and overwhelm networks with Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), TCP (SYN floods),
and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic. It can also accomplish Smurf style attacks and
provide a root shell bound to a TCP port of an unwitting victim computer system (Dittrich,
1999). Smurf attacks are ICMP floods
To mitigate this risk, packet filters must be used to quickly block traffic from the
offending IP subnet once the DOS attack commences.
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4.5 IDEVAL Modeling Results
Once we created and refined our network model using the IDEVAL data, we collected
hours of traffic from the UCF network. Then, we looked at the TCP/IP header information and
ran that information against our newly-created model.
Web servers, mail servers, routers, desktops, and other devices contributed data to our
study. These devices used a variety of operating systems, to include Windows XP, Windows
2000, Linux, and Solaris. Each day of our UCF data set contained 20-30 million packets,
averaging 300 packets captured per second.

4.5.1 IDEVAL and UCF Data Differences

The UCF data differed from the IDEVAL in the following ways:
1. DHCP is used at UCF and the IP addresses are dynamically allocated.
2. Telnet and FTP connections are almost non-existent on the UCF networks. Most of
these services are handled through Secure Shell (SSH) and secure FTP protocols.
3. In addition to using port 80 for HTTP requests, the UCF web servers use port 443 for
the incoming HTTPS requests to handle course scheduling and other personal
information for the students that require secure transactions.
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4. All of the UCF workstation and operating systems utilized operating systems that
were later versions than the IDEVAL. Although this is an obvious point, it needs to
be reiterated due to the large number of viruses, worms, and Trojan horses that still
traverse our networks almost unabated due to improperly updated operating systems
and networks.

4.5.2 UCF Data Set Score Results

We scored the UCF data with our network model and found that approximately 32.9% of
the sessions were identified as having a probability of 1.0000 of being an attack session, given
the data from our original model. A “score” of 1.0000 indicates that the classification model has
used its predictive data-mining techniques to determine that this session is has a high probability
of containing attack packet(s).
Although a probability of 1.0000 normally represents absolute certainty, here it
represents a starting point where we can further examine the data and see how well our model
performed.

Conversely, a session that scored a probability lower than 1.0000 does not

necessarily mean that session is a “good” session; however, the likelihood is high that session is
innocuous and poses no threat to our campus networks.
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The vast majority of the sessions captured had a low or non-existent probability of being
an attack session. Our studies show that more than sixty-six percent of the sessions captured
have an attack probability of 0.0129.
Most of the anomalous sessions that were tagged in the high-probability zone were webbased port 80 traffic; further, many suspicious sessions also contained high-numbered ports from
the source address that were not commonly used. Finally, for the majority of this research, we
limit our discussion to TCP packets only. Later research will model more than just TCP packet
traffic. Figure 4.6 shows the number of packets per suspicious session.

Figure 4. 9. Number of Packets / Suspect Session
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Similarly, most of the TCP packets could be removed from the attack list; for example, a
substantial number probable attack TCP packets were NFS packets – a protocol not used in the
1999 IDEVAL. Further, little-used services like di-traceware were found in the UCF data that
ran against our model and caused those packets to be tagged as highly probable attacks.
Overall, out of the approximately 30,000 sessions that were labeled as highly probable
attack sessions by our model, a small percentage of those sessions were deemed as probable
attacks from the use of a freeware signature-based IDS system called Snort. Further, our model
did label approximately eighty-five percent of the probable attacks properly.

4.6 SAND Modeling
While our initial network model using the IDEVAL data set proved promising, a morerecent and more-relevant set of data was needed to continue to improve on the modeling
methodology. A newer training and validation model that more-closely resembled the scored
data set would be needed to produce better predictive results; so, we developed this model using
the Session-based Anomaly Notification Detector (SAND). The figure below shows the SAND
Modeling Algorithm:
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Figure 4. 10. SAND Modeling Algorithm

4.6.1 SAND Process

SAND begins the process by loop modeling the network traffic at critical points in the
network. For our research, we chose one critical point to retrieve the network data. All data
retrieved are stored in tcpdump format.
As the collected data was six months old, we were able to analyze the entire data set
using the Snort IDS tool. From this initial analysis, Snort found 1,386 alerts in the data set.
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These alerts were tagged in the data set as attacks and the corresponding TGT variable was given
a value of 1.
After the attack packets are identified and labeled, we created a SAS module that merges
the attack packet data set with less than one percent of the original data set that contains thirtytwo percent of the identified attacks. This methodology would thereby create a solid data set to
properly model the network correctly and identify anomalous behavior coming into or out of the
network at the gateway.

Table 4. 2. Training and Score Sets

Size in Packets
Notes
Data Set

and Sessions

# of Attacks ID’d

Entire Set

109 million (100%)

1,365 attacks (100%)

Only 2.5 hours

FIT Training

1.5 million (1.38%)

463 attacks (33.92%)

Non-contiguous

2 attacks (0.15%)

1 min, 20 sec

= 1,740 sessions
FIT Score 1

633 thousand
(0.58%)
= 9,257 sessions
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FIT Score 2

465 thousand

6 attacks (0.44%)

1 min, 0 sec

(0.42%)
= 5,658 sessions

From the above table, we can see that the entire data set contained more than 109 million
packets. Out of those packets, we used 1.38% of the data (1.5 million packets) to create our
training and validation data set. This data set formed the nucleus of our network’s model at that
particular juncture. We used a non-contiguous set of packets to form this model – overall there
were five sections of the entire data set that were merged to form this non-contiguous model.
Within each of the five sections were several hundred thousand packets that are
contiguous with respect to time. We chose this methodology in order to maximize the number of
attacks (33.92%) relative to the number of packets in the data set itself. This is the first instance
of oversampling the data in order to bring out the data set characteristics that exist on this
network. The figure below shows this oversampling of non-contiguous data.
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Figure 4. 11. Training Data Set

4.6.2 Score Data Set 1

As seen in table 4.2 above, score data set 1 has over 633 thousand packets but only two
actual attacks to find. Within the first score data set, we have a total of two attacks and two types
of attacks:
•

SCAN FIN – Attack “3176” – This is a scan/probe where a TCP packet is detected

where only the FIN flag is set to 1; all other flags are set to 0. Most Windows machines will
respond with an ACK-RST regardless of whether or not the port is open (SourceFire, 2005e).
•

Bare Byte Encoding – Attack “3202” – This is an attack against IIS servers that uses

non-ASCII characters as valid values in decoding UTF-8 values. Bare byte encoding allows the
user to emulate an IIS server (SourceFire, 2005c).
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In the figures below, we show the effectiveness of the four models in finding these two
attacks shown above. The four models are as follows:
1. 9% attack sessions (“9/91”)
2. 18% attack sessions (“18/82”)
3. 36% attack sessions (“36/64”)
4. 40% attack sessions (“40/60”)

Figure 4. 12. Unnormalized Results - Score Set 1
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From Figure 4.11, we see that models 18/82 and 40/60 are particularly effective finding
the SCAN FIN attack; in fact, all four models met the minimum threshold of a 0.5 predictive
value when finding the SCAN FIN attack in this scored data set. However, none of the models
found the second attack (Bad Byte) but 18/82 performed the best, percentage-wise, in both attack
cases. Figure 4.12 shows the normalized results with no major change for any of the models.

Figure 4. 13. Normalized Results - Score Set 1

A corresponding chart (Figure 4.13) shows the false alarm rate in these four models.
Both 9/91 and 18/82 models performed the best and it showed in the results seen in the previous
figures.
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Newman, Snyder, & Thayer (2002) discussed false alarm rates in various commercial and
noncommercial IDSs and their impact on the IDS’s effectiveness. However, their discussion
centered on signature-based IDS systems and not anomaly-based systems.
Although the false-alarm rates seem to be rather high, this is not unusual for anomalydetection schemes (Allen, 2003; Axelsson, 1999; Tan, Steinbach, & Kumar, 2005). The key is to
reduce the false alarm rate in any production system. For our research, the path to false alarm
rate reduction is accomplished by adding more information to our training and validation data
sets and making our decision tree leafier. These subjects will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 5.

Figure 4. 14. False Alarm Rate - Score Set 1
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4.6.3 Score Data Set 2

As seen in table 4.2 above, score data set 2 has almost 500 thousand packets but only a
few attacks to find. Within the second score data set, we have a total of six attacks and two types
of attacks:
•

Bare Byte Encoding – Attacks 1 & 2 – This is an attack against IIS servers that uses

non-ASCII characters as valid values in decoding UTF-8 values. Bare byte encoding allows the
user to emulate an IIS server (SourceFire, 2005c).
•

Bad traffic – loopback traffic – Attacks 3-6 – Under normal circumstances traffic to

the localhost (127.0.0.0/8) should only be seen on the loopback interface (lo0). This attack is an
indicator of unauthorized network use, reconnaissance activity or system compromise
(SourceFire, 2005a).

In the two figures below, we show the effectiveness of our twelve models as we
oversample the training and validation set at different levels. The x-axis shows the different
models used, from 4% attacks to 81% attacks in the database. The higher the data goes on the yaxis, the better the model performed in predicting the attacks. Each different color in the bar
codings represent a different attack (six in total).

74

Figure 4. 15. Attacks 1, 2, and 3 Results

Although the first set of results (attacks 1-3) was promising, the second set proved more
effective when predicting the attacks. Within either set, however, the oversampled model that
contained 18% attacks proved to be the best predictor for finding the six attacks.

75

Figure 4. 16. Attacks 4, 5, and 6 Results
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CHAPTER 5: ADVANCED TECHNIQUES ON SESSION-BASED IDS

The analysis shown in the previous chapter on the FIT data set provided a glimpse into how
a session-based network IDS model would work. However, the modeling of the training and
validation data sets provided a snapshot of how to obtain a good model only; indeed, the existence
of a “good” model was sometimes due to pure chance. We now need to look more closely at the
types of attacks that are present and re-model the network to account for those types of attacks as
well as to include advanced data mining techniques like bootstrapping that can improve our results
and lessen the effects of random chance.

5.1 The Seven Attack Types
As we analyzed the training and validation data sets, we used the Snort IDS application to
sift through the data and identify all of the attacks present in the six-month-old data sets. From
this action we determined that seven attacks occurred.
These attacks were tagged and catalogued during the process of session building as
mentioned in the previous chapter. In contrast to the previous chapter, we removed the “TGT”
variable from the target list and inserted an “alert-id” variable to be the new target. This “alertid” variable – unlike the previous target variable that simply determined the presence of an attack
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(yes/no Boolean variable) – shows us what type of attack was present and provides insight into
the model’s effectiveness in predicting future attacks.
Below we describe the seven attacks and how accurate our models were in predicting the
instance of future attacks in the separate score data sets.

5.1.1 Bad Traffic – Loopback Traffic

SourceFire describes (2005a) this attack as a reconnaissance probe where an attacked
uses a spoofed address (in this case, the localhost IP address for the owner’s computer, which is
always 127.0.0.1) and tries to gather more information on the potential victim’s computer and
associated network.
This usually indicates a probe since it is seen coming from the network and not from the
computer’s loopback interface, lo0. It is somewhat possible for an attacker to spoof this address
and use it to attack a target computer on another interface. But, since this event can only indicate
malicious intent, it is a very reliable signature event if it occurs.

Advanced data mining

techniques like bootstrapping (see section 5.2) will assist in detecting these types of attacks since
there is a possibility that an error and not a malicious attempt had caused this event to occur.
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5.1.2 Bad Traffic – TCP Port 0 Traffic

SourceFire describes (2005b) this event as another possible reconnaissance probe where
an attacker tries to verify the existence of a host at a particular address or address range. TCP
traffic over port 0 is not normal traffic. Although it is possible that an incorrectly configured
network device could trigger this event filter, the more-likely scenario is an attacker trying to see
if a computer exists by sending traffic over port 0 on the TCP side.

5.1.3 Bare Byte Unicode Encoding

This event is generated when the Snort preprocessor program, http_inspect, detects
network traffic that may be malicious in nature. SourceFire describes (2005c) the bare byte
Unicode encoding attack as a possible attempt to evade detection by an IDS system watching the
network’s gateway traffic. The attack is detected when a web browser sends non-ASCII values
to a Microsoft IIS web server without encoding those values with a % sign. This non-standard
format request is regarded as a probable attack against that web server.
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5.1.4 FTP Exploit Stat

SourceFire describes (2005d) this attack as a malicious attempt to execute the STAT
command – in conjunction with the file globbing (wildcard) “*” character – against Microsoft
IIS FTP servers. When this denial of service (DOS) command is received by an unprotected IIS
FTP server, the server crashes. Microsoft has released several security patches to address this
issue but hackers still use this type of attack against FTP servers to see if the patch has been
applied.

5.1.5 Scan FIN

SourceFire describes (2005e) the Scan FIN attack as a crafted packet that has only its FIN
flag set. All other flags are set to zero. Most Windows machines will respond with a packet that
has the ACK and RST flags set regardless of whether or not the corresponding port is open.
Most Unix systems, however, will respond with an ACK and RST packet only if the port is
closed.
The Scan FIN is a probing attack and may indicate that an attacker is trying to figure out
which ports are open and which ports are closed on a victim machine. The principle of locality
comes into play when looking at the data surrounding this probing attack since you have a
definite action (FIN packet) followed by a definite response (ACK-RST, usually) that will be
picked up during our modeling process.

When crafting the training data set, keeping the

“nearby” sessions will prove crucial to our detecting this attack in the score data sets.
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5.1.6 SNMP Request TCP

The SNMP Request TCP attack is an event that is generated when an attacker is trying to
gather information by directing a packet to TCP port 161 (SourceFire, 2005f). If the SNMP
daemon responds to the trap request, the attacker can then proceed to launch subsequent attacks
against the SNMP server program.
Using a packet-filtering firewall that only allows well-known servers to send this
connection request to port 161 can block these types of probes. However, using a bootstrapping
data mining technique on these sessions in order to improve our model’s effectiveness can
bolster our training and validation data sets. Bootstrapping is discussed in further detail in
section 5.2.

5.1.7 Whisker Tab Splice Attack

SourceFire describes (2005g) the Whisker tab splice attack as a way for attackers to
evade IDS detection. Since some web servers interpret tabs as they would spaces, then an
attacker can send a malicious request to the web server using tabs in place of spaces. This could
evade the IDS since most IDS variants will probably only be looking for the attacks with spaces
in the command lines, not tabs.
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5.2 Bootstrapping
When using data mining techniques to find pertinent results in our network traffic data,
we tried several variations on the data to attain the most productive models.

Even small

modifications to the training data set – like deleting one row – caused great differences in the
effectiveness and reliability of our model.
After our initial set of experiments, we concentrated on using our SAND methodology on
models that exist in the 4/96 to 9/91 (attack/non-attack) range.

We noted in our earlier

experiments that models that fall outside of this range either have low rates of true positives (i.e.,
those models with less than 4% attacks in the data set) or have high misclassification rates and
correspondingly high false positive rates (i.e., those models with more than 9% attacks in the
data set).

5.2.1 Scalable Data Mining and Bootstrapping

In their white paper on this subject, Small and Edelstein (2005) described how scalable
data mining concepts like bootstrapping produced positive results in their research. They further
describe the benefits of improvements in computing power, storage capacity, and computing cost
– all of which helped them to analyze large amounts of data.
The authors state how a computationally-intense process like bootstrapping can assist
when validating and model: if you have 1,000 rows of data, you build a sample of 1,000 rows by
choosing one row at a time, at random, and extracting that row by placing it into the sample data
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set. You repeat this process over and over again and keep choosing one row until you have
1,000 rows in your sample data set. Some rows may be repeated; some may not appear at all.
Then, you split the sample set into two groups – one for training and the other for validation.
You repeat this model building cycle many times. The mean error rate is the mean over all of the
repetitions (bootstraps). As you build more models, you create a very low error rate.

5.2.2 SAND Bootstrapping

When modifying our original algorithm as stated in chapter 4, we decided to create a
looping algorithm that maintained the advantages of the original algorithm but added the
characteristics of a bootstrapping mechanism. This allowed us to generate dozens of random
samples and add to our model, layer by layer, until a more robust model was created.
Figure 5.1 describes the process of the SAND Bootstrapping Algorithm. Steps 1 through
4 and 6 through 8 were maintained from the original algorithm, but the latter three steps are now
encased in a loop within the algorithm. Step 5 was added and it simply creates a null set
(initializes the variable) for the variable newModel.
Once the model is created and we’ve scored the data set against the decision tree model
(step 8), we added two new steps that allow us to determine if the scoring of the data set was
successful; if so, we add the training data set (ok_subModel) to newModel. If not, we discard the
training set. Then we loop back to step 6 until our desired bootstrapped model is achieved.
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Figure 5. 1. SAND Bootstrapping Algorithm
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5.2.3 SAND Bootstrapping Results – Part I

As we built each of the twenty layers for the bootstrapped model, we found that
successive runs of the SAND Bootstrapping Algorithm produced better results. In Figure 5.2,
we note the correlations between the number of attacks found per run versus the number of false
alarms and normalized misclassification rates per same run. The maximum number of attacks
per run is three, shown in blue in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. While high misclassification rates (to get
“normalized” misclassification rates, we simply multiplied the rates by 100) usually produced
low false alarms, we also noted the fact that when we were successful in finding all three attacks,
we had a correspondingly high false alarm rate. This produced unacceptable levels of false
alarms, so our research concentrates, in later stages, upon specific attacks to form better models.

Figure 5. 2. Attacks Found vs False Alarms and Misclass Rate, part I
85

Figure 5.3 shows the same data without the false alarm information. The attacks found
versus normalized misclassification rate graph shows that a low misclassification rate produces a
good probability of finding the attack. This bit of information was key for our further research
since it enabled us to build our twenty models per bootstrap with a relatively low number of
attacks (4 to 9 percent range) versus non-attack sessions. Sessions with a higher number of
attacks usually produced unnormalized misclassification rates of 0.15 or higher for both the
training and validation data sets.

Figure 5. 3. Attacks Found vs Misclass Rate only, part I
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Figure 5.4 shows a typical sub-model resulting structure, as seen in the SAS Enterprise
Miner program. This decision tree model is shown as a yellow pie chart that graphically
delineates the variables that are important in the development of the model.

The

misclassification rate is shown for both training (blue line) and validation (red line) data sets. As
the decision tree is created layer by layer, the misclassification rate is adjusted.
The lower the misclassification rate, the better for the overall performance of the model.
Once the model “tops out” and cannot improve any further, the upper limit on the number of
leaves in the decision tree is met. This is shown below with the white vertical line that bisects
the red and blue data set lines. In SAS, you can manually adjust the tree to have more or less
leaves, but this adjustment usually provides no real improvement in the model’s performance
overall.
The sub-model shown below is one of the better performing models; indeed, it had one of
the lowest misclassification rates of any of the sub-models and it discovered one of the attacks
(attack 3176) well. It also had a very low false alarm rate, especially when compared to the other
sub-models.
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Figure 5. 4. Screenshot of SAS for Sub-Model X6

The sub-model seen in Figure 5.5 is similar to the previous sub-model in that it has a low
misclassification rate coupled with a low false alarm rate. This sub-model discovered only
attack 3176 as well and the yellow pie chart indicates that the variables that were important for
the development of this sub-model were important for the development of the previous submodel.
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Figure 5. 5. Screenshot of SAS for Sub-Model X7

Another useful bit of information was derived from the variable importance tables. When
SAS processes the decision tree, it determines the relative importance of the variables when
creating the tree. Not surprisingly, the destination meta-variable (which is a nominal input
variable that consists of the destination IP address concatenated with the destination port
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number) proved to be the most-important variable for our first bootstrapped model thirteen out of
twenty times. Table 5.1 below shows the entire important variable selections along with the submodel’s corresponding misclassification rate.

Table 5. 1. Misclass Rates and Variable Importance, part I

These twenty sub-models collectively make up the first bootstrap model that we
constructed. This bootstrap model attained true positives nearly 65% of the time while reducing
the number of false positives as well. We reduced the false positive number even further (to
0.062) when we removed the instances when we found all three attacks but also achieved an
abnormally high amount of false positives.
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5.2.4 SAND Bootstrapping Results – Part II

We learned several model-building lessons from the first bootstrap model that was shown
in section 5.2.3.

First, since the vast majority of our most-important variables was the

destination variable, we determined that ensuring that a few dozen nearby (i.e., closest to the
three attack sessions with regards to time) non-attack sessions were kept in our training and
validation sets. These nearby sessions provided some extra information for the data mining
application to use in its discovery phase while it was automatically constructing the decision tree
model.
Second, since some of our meta-variables were created for bookkeeping purposes, we
chose to reject those variables to ensure that they did not give misleading information to the data
mining application while it was constructing the model.

Variables like “firstseq,” which

indicated the sequence number of the first packet in a session, provide little usable information
for our data mining operation. Therefore, it was rejected or removed from consideration while
model construction continued.
removed from contention.

Similarly, variables like “firstack” and “firstobs” also were
Incidentally, these three variables were not removed from

consideration until after the fourth sub-model was constructed, as seen in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.6 describes the SAND bootstrap part II improvements made from SAND
bootstrap part I. For each sub-model in part II, we had more successes finding the attacks while
the false alarm rate was reduced by almost 25 percent. Although the average normalized
misclassification rate increased by 40 percent overall, the number of sub-models with extremely
high false alarms was reduced substantially.
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Figure 5. 6. Attacks Found vs False Alarms and Misclassification Rate, part II

Figure 5.7 shows the same data without the false alarm information. With three notable
exceptions – sub-models X2, X17, and X20 – most of the data that showed success in finding at
least one attack was directly related to the fluctuations of the misclassification rates.
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Figure 5. 7. Attacks Found vs Misclassification Rate only, part II

Collectively, these twenty sub-models in part II make up our entire second bootstrap
model. We had a similar set of important variables as seen in part I. These variables are shown
in Table 5.2. As before, the “destination” variable played the most-important variable role more
than a dozen times. The best combination of variables – when considering misclassification rate,
hit rate, and false alarm rate – appears to be “destination” along with “sumtos”.
The worst situation occurred when “destination” was determined to be the only important
variable, as seen in sub-models X13, X17 and X20. While these three sub-models found all
three attacks, they also had a very high false alarm rate.
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Table 5. 2. Misclass Rates and Variable Importance, part II

5.2.5 Future SAND Bootstrapping Research

Further research will be conducted regarding the modeling of specific attacks in
conjunction with two layers of our bootstrapping model. These unique models should be able to
more accurately portray a computer network by bootstrapping sub-models as shown above.
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The difference with these sub-models is that only one type of attack will be used when creating
the twenty decision trees (sub-models). These twenty sub-models will be bootstrapped together.
Then, a second layer of bootstrapping will occur when we overlay other bootstrap models that
addressed different attack types. The misclassification rates for these models will be extremely
low and the resulting false alarm rate should be reduced another 50 percent as well. Further
research will be conducted on increasing the number of sub-models to fifty to bring down the
misclassification rates and false alarm rates even further.
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CHAPTER 6: OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation began by describing the challenges facing the designers and engineers of
intrusion detection systems, particularly when using signature-based implementations.

We

proceeded with a review of current anomaly and data mining-based efforts, most of which
primarily examined pattern matching and rule creation techniques. We then discussed data
mining principles and their applications towards detecting novel intrusions in computer
networks, exploring the modeling capabilities of our system against pure network packets
contained in the UCF and IDEVAL data, as seen in section 4.5. Finally, we applied these
concepts towards our two sets of solutions – SAND and SAND with bootstrapping, producing
encouraging results.
During our discussion of current data mining principles and techniques, we turned our
attention to the usefulness of decision tree modeling in our type of research. Decision tree
modeling techniques are effective for analyzing very large data sets that we used in our research.
The biggest drawback is the fact that the results can be unstable because decision trees are data
driven constructs and small variations can lead to substantially different final solutions. We saw
this over and over again in our research when simple alterations of a few variables produced
dramatically different results. This disadvantage, however, was offset by the fact that decision
trees are accurate modeling tools that are intuitive and relatively easy to implement.
In our first implementation of Session-based Anomaly Notification Detector (SAND), we
chose data that were retrieved at one critical juncture in the network and modeled the network to
reflect the situation at that juncture alone. We then used our SAND algorithm to create meta96

variables, collapse the packets back into session-like constructs, remove extraneous variables
that proved to be of little value, and create the tree model itself.
Our second implementation of SAND (with bootstrapping) gave us improved results over
the non-bootstrapped model. Bootstrapping is a somewhat new concept where you repeat the
modeling process in an iterative fashion and keep choosing one row until you have multiple rows
in your sample data set. During this process, we may see that some rows may be repeated; on
the other hand, some rows may not be selected at all. Subsequently, we split the sample set into
two groups – one for training and the other for validation. After we repeated this model-building
process many times, we see that our mean error rate – which is the mean over all of the
repetitions (bootstraps) – becomes very low as we build more models.

6.1 Summary of Results

Our experiments tested whether the SAND and SAND with bootstrapping techniques
could detect a set of attacks in the FIT data set. We first experimented with modeling pure TCP
packets contained in the UCF and IDEVAL data; however, the issues of attack predictability,
false alarm rates, and efficiency of the program came into play and supported our assertions that
a better way could be found to produce anomaly-based results.
In the SAND without bootstrapping methodology as seen in Section 4.6, we produced
promising results with our session-based models (see Figures 4.12 through 4.16) but still
maintained a relatively high number of false alarms when compared to the SAND with
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bootstrapping modeling (Figures 5.2 through 5.7).

Interestingly, the best-fit percentage of

attacks in the SAND without bootstrapping modeling occurred with eighteen percent of the
model’s sessions consisting of attack information; the best-fit percentage of attacks in the SAND
with bootstrapping, however, occurred with 4 to 9 percent of the model’s sessions containing
attacks, which was shown in Section 5.2.
For each sub-model in the second set of network modeling with the FIT data, we had a
greater amount of success finding the attacks while the false alarm rate was reduced by almost 25
percent. Although the average normalized misclassification rate increased by 40 percent overall,
the number of sub-models with extremely high false alarms was reduced substantially to a more
manageable level.

6.2 Future Work

Both of the techniques shown in this dissertation – SAND with and without bootstrapping
– provide a glimpse into the future of network modeling and anomaly identification techniques.
Further research will be conducted on these projects to improve upon the results found over the
last year.
The first modification to our research will be the introduction of a multi-variate variable
(i.e., non-binary variable) as the target variable in our data mining research. This target variable
will have the type of attack as its value. Currently, we simply use a binary (yes/no) target
variable to indicate the presence of an attack in our training and validation data sets. We will
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strive to introduce an alert identification target variable, which will allow us to build decision
trees around the type of attack seen in the training and validation data. We started to create these
models but processing power and storage capacity became an issue quickly in this scenario.
Creating and modifying millions of packets into sessions with non-binary target variables create
very complex models.
Further, other programs like CART may provide better solution sets for this issue. As
stated in chapter 4, SAS was viewed upon simply as an efficient and convenient software tool to
support our research methodology; however, the tool itself that we choose to use can be easily
changed.
In chapter 5 we discussed the SAND bootstrapping process and mentioned that twenty
iterations were sufficient for our bootstrapping needs; however, more research is required to be
conducted in order to see if there is an upper threshold of bootstrapping. In other words, how
many sub-models can we create and continue to improve upon the hit rates and false alarm rates
until we stop making improvements by adding more sub-models to our data? In our current data
set, it appears that five to ten more sub-models would improve our results but any more additions
to the model would prove extraneous. In other situations, however, the creation of fifty to one
hundred sub-models may prove worthwhile to explore.
Other work in this area is needed to concentrate our models on specific attack types. This
research could be conducted in conjunction with the modified target variable environment
discussed above. Our research showed that the models’ performance measures were improved
when we directed the model to use only one type of variable in the attack pool. Creating submodels on this basis – that is, each sub-model is created and keyed against a specific, separate
attack type – should produce solid results when these sub-models are bootstrapped together.
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Finally, our future research should concentrate on automating the entire data mining
process better and more efficiently. Using C++ instead of Java as well as converting a lot of our
SAS code into pure SQL statements would provide substantial efficiencies in the storage and
processing times of our research work. Also, using these new and better-automated tools would
help immensely when we acquire more data from various sources to test our theories out.

6.3 Conclusions

We have demonstrated a unique concept in modeling anomalous traffic – using data
mining tools and techniques in order to model network behavior and catch anomalous traffic on a
given network.
Both techniques have great potential for future research.

However, SAND with

bootstrapping provides a more-promising vision for the future of modeling networks to detect
anomalous behavior.
All of the limitations of the original SAND model are mitigated when bootstrapping is
introduced. False alarm rates go down substantially while the probability of finding an attack is
increased. While not perfect, we have shown that these techniques provide a promising approach
to future research in this area of network security.
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE RUNS OF SAND
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Appendix A describes the process and the results generated by the implementation of our
Session-based Anomaly Notification Detector (SAND). First, we describe the algorithm first seen
in Chapter 4; then, we run through the process, step-by-step and describe the results.

A.1 The SAND Algorithm

The algorithm originally shown in Figure 4.10 is shown again in Figure A.1.

Figure A. 1. SAND Algorithm
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A.1.1 Step 1 – Identify Attacks in Database

We used the editcap to take a saved capture file as its input and then write some or all of
the packets into another capture file. We used this program to take the original file and slice the
file up into smaller files, each containing 100 thousand packets. This allowed us to process the
data faster as our Java program could not handle resulting text files with much more than 100
thousand packets.
An example set of editcap commands are shown below. Generally, this is the first step
when slicing apart a raw network data dump; here, we used editcap to take apart a file called
“tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump.”
We then created a corresponding file with our own naming convention. The crafted file
on line 1 – “10-30tcp101300k.tcpdump” simply means that it is a file with 100,000 packets from
the October 30th (10-30) data set; and, the last bit of information is from packet number
101,300,000 (101300k).
Batch files were created to handle these types of operations in order to reduce the drag on
our system’s resources since more than 100,000 packets usually presented technical problems
during our data preparation phase.

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101300k.tcpdump 101200001-101300000

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101400k.tcpdump 101300001-101400000

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101500k.tcpdump 101400001-101500000

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101600k.tcpdump 101500001-101600000

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101700k.tcpdump 101600001-101700000

c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101800k.tcpdump 101700001-101800000
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c:\>

editcap -r tcp.2004-10-30.tcpdump 10-30tcp101900k.tcpdump 101800001-101900000

We then turned to our Java program to properly format our data sets. The original data
was then split into training and validation data sets, where the IDS program called Snort played a
key role. Snort analyzed one portion of the entire data set – this portion contained 2.4 million
packets and hundreds of attack packets.

A.1.2 Step 2 – Create New Variables (“meta-variables”)

After we completed the initial formatting of the data, we turned to using SAS code to
create new variables and to clean up the current set of variables present. The SAS code is shown
below.
The first set of the code simply copies the file called “wide_new” under the “fit”
directory and creates a new file called “tcpWide” in the same directory in SAS.

data fit.tcpWide; set fit.wide_new;

Then, we strip out the non-TCP packets from the data set and start counting the number
of observations (countobs).
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IF PROTO = 'UDP' THEN DELETE;
IF PROTO = 'ARP' THEN DELETE;
IF ID = 'ID' THEN DELETE;
IF SRC_PT = 'ICMP' THEN DELETE;
IF DEST_PT = 'ICMP' THEN DELETE;
sp = ' : ';
ar = ' -> ';
DROP count;
RETAIN countobs;
IF countobs > 0 THEN countobs = countobs + 1;
ELSE countobs = 0;
IF countobs = 0 THEN countobs = countobs + 1;

Next, we take the flag values from our Java program and reset them to be binary values:

IF R1 = 'NoR1' THEN _R1 = 0; ELSE _R1 = 1;
IF R2 = 'NoR2' THEN _R2 = 0; ELSE _R2 = 1;
IF URG = 'NO-U' THEN _URG = 0; ELSE _URG = 1;
IF ACK = 'NO-A' THEN _ACK = 0; ELSE _ACK = 1;
IF PSH = 'NO-P' THEN _PSH = 0; ELSE _PSH = 1;
IF RST = 'NO-R' THEN _RST = 0; ELSE _RST = 1;
IF SYN = 'NO-S' THEN _SYN = 0; ELSE _SYN = 1;
IF FIN = 'NO-F' THEN _FIN = 0; ELSE _FIN = 1;

Then we create a new variable called “_newID” – which will eventually be called
“newID” due to SAS coding idiosyncrasies – which is a metavariable containing source IP and
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port numbers; destination IP and port numbers; SYN and FIN flags; and, number of observations
counted. The DROP and RENAME functions are quirks of the programming environment which
force us to use temporary variable names – i.e., those preceded by an underscore character – and
then drop the real names (R1, R2, URG, etc) prior to renaming the temporary variable names
back to the real names.

_newID = SRC_IP || sp || SRC_PT || ar || DEST_IP || sp || DEST_PT || sp || _SYN ||
sp || _FIN || sp || countobs;

DROP R1 R2 URG ACK PSH RST SYN FIN;

RENAME _R1 = R1;
RENAME _R2 = R2;
RENAME _URG = URG;
RENAME _ACK = ACK;
RENAME _PSH = PSH;
RENAME _RST = RST;
RENAME _SYN = SYN;
RENAME _FIN = FIN;
DROP newID sp ar;
RENAME _newID = newID;

The FORMAT and INFORMAT statements allow us to associate formats and informats
to our set of variables. The FORMAT statement gives a special SAS instruction for writing a
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variable. Conversely, the INFORMAT statement gives special SAS instructions when reading a
variable. The statement below are for integers (interval variables) of length 1 or 2.

FORMAT TGT 1.;
FORMAT DF 1.;
FORMAT newIPL 1.;
FORMAT newTCPL 1.;
FORMAT newTOS 1.;
FORMAT newTTL 1.;
FORMAT newFRAG 1.;
FORMAT R1 1.;
FORMAT R2 1.;
FORMAT URG 1.;
FORMAT ACK 1.;
FORMAT PSH 1.;
FORMAT RST 1.;
FORMAT SYN 1.;
FORMAT FIN 1.;
FORMAT MO 2.;
FORMAT DY 2.;
FORMAT HR 2.;
FORMAT MN 2.;

INFORMAT TGT 1.;
INFORMAT DF 1.;
INFORMAT newIPL 1.;
INFORMAT newTCPL 1.;
INFORMAT newTOS 1.;
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INFORMAT newTTL 1.;
INFORMAT newFRAG 1.;
INFORMAT R1 1.;
INFORMAT R2 1.;
INFORMAT URG 1.;
INFORMAT ACK 1.;
INFORMAT PSH 1.;
INFORMAT RST 1.;
INFORMAT SYN 1.;
INFORMAT FIN 1.;
INFORMAT MO 2.;
INFORMAT DY 2.;
INFORMAT HR 2.;
INFORMAT MN 2.;
run;

After we ran the SAS code shown above, we then created a “fitmerge” file that combined
the results from the “tcpwide” file with the “fitnewalerts” file that contained all of the Snortidentified alerts in our training data set. The resulting file contained the one-to-many merged
results that were keyed on the MN (minutes) and SEC_MSEC (seconds and milliseconds)
variables.
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data fit.fitmerge;

MERGE fit.tcpwide fit.fitnewalerts;

BY MN SEC_MSEC;

run;

We then executed a series of commands in SAS that continues to create metavariables
and also collapses the data into session-like structures. Collapsing the data had two practical
effects on our research – it created unique and helpful data patterns not present in the original
network packet format and it also drastically reduced the amount of processing time and
processing power required to create the decision tree model.
The code below creates a new file called “coll_new” in the fit directory from the
“fitmerge” file mentioned earlier. The RETAIN statement in SAS allows the system to preserve
a variable’s value from the previous iteration of the DATA step.

data fit.coll_new; set fit.fitmerge;

RETAIN sessionNUM;
RETAIN ok;
RETAIN source;
RETAIN destination;
RETAIN firstobs;
RETAIN lastobs;
RETAIN firstsec;
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RETAIN firstID;
RETAIN firstSEQ;
RETAIN firstACK;

A.1.3 Steps 3 & 4 – Collapse data into sessions and remove extraneous variables

Then we created a collapsed session for the first observed packet. New variables like
firstobs, firstsec, firstID, firstSEQ, and firstACK are used for bookkeeping and to also see if the
new variable can attain some importance in our model later.

IF countobs = 1 THEN DO;
source = SRC_IP || SRC_PT;
destination = DEST_IP || DEST_PT;
firstobs = countobs;
firstsec = HR || MN || SEC_MSEC;
firstID = ID;
firstSEQ = SEQNUM;
firstACK = ACKNUM;
sessionNUM = 1;
END;
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Next, we created collapsed sessions for the remaining observed packets in our training
data set.

ELSE IF SYN = 1 THEN DO;
source = SRC_IP || SRC_PT;
destination = DEST_IP || DEST_PT;
sessionNUM = sessionNUM + 1;
firstobs = countobs;
firstsec = HR || MN || SEC_MSEC;
firstID = ID;
firstSEQ = SEQNUM;
firstACK = ACKNUM;
END;

run;

PROC SQL statement was then used to create a table of data (“coll_new2”) and to group
the data together. Further, we established four new variables each for seven of the interval
variables. These four new variables were derived from the minimum (min) function, maximum
(max) function, average (avg) function, and summation (sum) function. It turns out that most of
these new variables were not useful in our model creation stages, but a few were – especially
SUMTTL and MAXTTL.
We then deleted extraneous variables (FIRSTID, FIRSTSEQ, etc) along the way as we
determined which ones were not important to our research.
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proc sql;

create table fit.coll_new2 as

select sessionNUM, firstobs,
firstsec, count(*) as numPKTS,
firstID, source, destination, max(TGT) as newTGT,
firstSEQ, firstACK, min(TTL) as minTTL,
max(TTL) as maxTTL, avg(TTL) as avgTTL,
sum(TTL) as sumTTL, min(IPL) as minIPL,
max(IPL) as maxIPL, avg(IPL) as avgIPL,
sum(IPL) as sumIPL, min(DGML) as minDGML,
max(DGML) as maxDGML, avg(DGML) as avgDGML,
sum(DGML) as sumDGML, min(TCPL) as minTCPL,
max(TCPL) as maxTCPL, avg(TCPL) as avgTCPL,
sum(TCPL) as sumTCPL, min(LEN) as minLEN,
max(LEN) as maxLEN, avg(LEN) as avgLEN,
sum(LEN) as sumLEN, min(TOS) as minTOS,
max(TOS) as maxTOS, avg(TOS) as avgTOS,
sum(TOS) as sumTOS, min(WIN) as minWIN,
max(WIN) as maxWIN, avg(WIN) as avgWIN,
sum(WIN) as sumWIN

from fit.coll_new
group by sessionNUM, firstobs, firstsec,
firstID, source, destination, firstSEQ, firstACK;
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A.1.4 Step 5 – Generate random samples

To boost our attack rate in our data and pre-selected rates, we kept the sessions that
contained attack packets and removed only non-attack sessions in order to create a more
meaningful sample of data to train.
In the code shown below, we established a uniform random variable for each session
called “rand.” If the session was a non-attack session (newTGT = 0) and the rand variable was
greater than a certain value (here it is 0.03) then we deleted that session and dropped the rand
variable from the data set.
This last step was key since we found out that keeping the rand variable in our data set
skewed the results and produced models that gave top importance to the rand variable and found
a small number of attacks in our score data set.

data fit.coll_final; set fit.coll_new2;

rand = ranuni(0);

if newTGT = 0 and rand > 0.03 THEN DELETE;

DROP rand;

run;
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A.1.5 Step 6 – Create decision tree model

The decision tree model was then created, as seen in Figure A.2. The pie chart shown in
the tree visualization represents the top, root node of the tree (inner-most circle) and the
subsequent branches of the decision tree (outer circles extending from the inner-most circle).
Generally, any training or validation set that had a misclassification rate of greater than
0.08 were unusable. These relatively high misclassification rates normally produced extremely
high false alarm rates in our data. Further, trees that had three or less leaves were usually
unusable as well. These trees usually produced results where no sessions were found to be
attacks.
In a similar vein, decision trees that contained unusually low misclassification rates (i.e.,
those less than 0.015) normally produced results where no sessions were found to be attack
sessions in the score data.
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Figure A. 2. Example Decision Tree Visualization

A.1.6 Step 7 – Apply score data set to decision tree model

After creating the decision tree model from our training and validation data sets, we ran
that model against a separate set of data from the same source. Earlier tests against different sets
of data from different sources produced surprisingly good results. Our research with sets of data
from the same source did not disappoint either.
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The SAS code below shows several macro variables (delineated by the “%” character),
which allow us to use them over and over again for the same function in different spots during
the execution of the SAS program.
The %let statements at the beginning denote the score data set that we are working on
(“coll_new2”) and the resulting predicted data set (“X”) that shows how well our model worked
in trying to find the attacks in the score set using our anomaly-based methodology.

%let _Score=fitscore.coll_new2;
%let _predict=fitscore.X;

%macro DMNORLEN; 32 %mend DMNORLEN;

%macro DMNORMCP(in,out);
&out=substr(left(&in),1,min(%dmnorlen,length(left(&in))));
&out=upcase(&out);

%mend DMNORMCP;

%macro DMNORMIP(in);
&in=left(&in);
&in=substr(&in,1,min(%dmnorlen,length(&in)));
&in=upcase(&in);
%mend DMNORMIP;
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DATA &_PREDICT ; SET &_SCORE ;

%macro DMNORLEN; 32 %mend DMNORLEN;

%macro DMNORMCP(in,out);
&out=substr(left(&in),1,min(%dmnorlen,length(left(&in))));
&out=upcase(&out);
%mend DMNORMCP;

%macro DMNORMIP(in);
&in=left(&in);
&in=substr(&in,1,min(%dmnorlen,length(&in)));
&in=upcase(&in);
%mend DMNORMIP;

DATA &_PREDICT ; SET &_SCORE ;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
*

START_CHUNK 1431122153.5:T2Z7NB6Y

*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
*

END_CHUNK 1431122153.5:T2Z7NB6Y

*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
*

START_CHUNK 1431179796.9:T3CIS7YA

*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
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*

END_CHUNK 1431179796.9:T3CIS7YA

*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
*

START_CHUNK 1431179812.4:T00UYZOX

*;

*-----------------------------------------------------*;
*

;

*

TOOL : Tree

;

*

TYPE : MODEL

;

*

NODE : Tree [T00UYZOX]

;

*

;

*------------------------------------------------------;
*

;

*

MODEL NAME : Untitled

;

*

DESCRIPTION :

;

*
*

;
TARGET : NEWTGT

;

*------------------------------------------------------;

Then, new variables are created in the predicted data set (“X”) called I_NEWTGT,
F_NEWTGT, and so on.

**********************************************************;
****** DECISION TREE SCORING CODE ******;
*******************************************************;
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****** LENGTHS OF NEW CHARACTER VARIABLES ******;

LENGTH I_NEWTGT $ 12;
LENGTH F_NEWTGT $ 12;
LENGTH _WARN_ $ 4;
****** LABELS FOR NEW VARIABLES ******;
LABEL _NODE_ = 'Node';
LABEL _LEAF_ = 'Leaf';
LABEL P_NEWTGT0 = 'Predicted: NEWTGT=0';
LABEL P_NEWTGT1 = 'Predicted: NEWTGT=1';
LABEL I_NEWTGT = 'Into: NEWTGT';
LABEL U_NEWTGT = 'Unnormalized Into: NEWTGT';
LABEL F_NEWTGT = 'From: NEWTGT';
LABEL R_NEWTGT0 = 'Residual: NEWTGT=0';
LABEL R_NEWTGT1 = 'Residual: NEWTGT=1';
LABEL _WARN_ = 'Warnings';

****** TEMPORARY VARIABLES FOR FORMATTED VALUES ******;
LENGTH _ARBFMT_2 $ 12;
DROP _ARBFMT_2;
_ARBFMT_2 = ' ';

/* Initialize to avoid warning. */
LENGTH _ARBFMT_4 $ 27;
DROP _ARBFMT_4;
_ARBFMT_4 = ' ';

/* Initialize to avoid warning. */
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_ARBFMT_2 = PUT( NEWTGT , BEST12.);
%DMNORMCP( _ARBFMT_2, F_NEWTGT );

The next sequence of SAS code assigns the observations (sessions) to a certain node and
gives it a corresponding predictive value for the probability of whether or not that session is an
attack. This is represented by the P_NEWTGT1 variable. If it is greater than 0.5 then that
session is probably an attack session.

****** ASSIGN OBSERVATION TO NODE ******;
IF NOT MISSING(FIRSTSEQ ) AND
1026865988.5 <= FIRSTSEQ THEN DO;
IF NOT MISSING(FIRSTID ) AND
37468.5 <= FIRSTID THEN DO;
_NODE_ = 7;
_LEAF_ = 6;
P_NEWTGT0 = 1;
P_NEWTGT1 = 0;
I_NEWTGT = '0';
U_NEWTGT = 0;
END;

ELSE DO;
_ARBFMT_4 = PUT( DESTINATION , $27.);
%DMNORMIP( _ARBFMT_4);
IF _ARBFMT_4 IN ('163.118.222.94
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27663' ,

'163.118.98.10

2112' ,'163.118.178.0

'163.118.178.0

44381' ,'163.118.218.237

THEN DO;
_NODE_ = 11;
_LEAF_ = 5;

P_NEWTGT0 = 1;
P_NEWTGT1 = 0;
I_NEWTGT = '0';
U_NEWTGT = 0;
END;

ELSE DO;
_NODE_ = 10;
_LEAF_ = 4;
P_NEWTGT0 = 0;
P_NEWTGT1 = 1;
I_NEWTGT = '1';
U_NEWTGT = 1;
END;

END;
END;
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57731' ,
0' )

The code below shows how a crafted variable like SUMTTL can have a positive impact
on the predictive nature of our model. Here, the P_NEWTGT1 variable has a value of 0.83333.

ELSE DO;
IF NOT MISSING(SUMTTL ) AND
35142.5 <= SUMTTL THEN DO;
_NODE_ = 5;
_LEAF_ = 3;
P_NEWTGT0 = 0.16666666666666;
P_NEWTGT1 = 0.83333333333333;
I_NEWTGT = '1';
U_NEWTGT = 1;
END;

ELSE DO;
IF NOT MISSING(NUMPKTS ) AND
80.5 <= NUMPKTS THEN DO;
_NODE_ = 9;
_LEAF_ = 2;
P_NEWTGT0 = 0.78723404255319;
P_NEWTGT1 = 0.2127659574468;
I_NEWTGT = '0';
U_NEWTGT = 0;
END;

ELSE DO;
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_NODE_ = 8;
_LEAF_ = 1;
P_NEWTGT0 = 0.97692307692307;
P_NEWTGT1 = 0.02307692307692;
I_NEWTGT = '0';
U_NEWTGT = 0;
END;
END;
END;

***** RESIDUALS R_ *************;
IF F_NEWTGT NE '0'
AND F_NEWTGT NE '1' THEN DO;
R_NEWTGT0 = .;
R_NEWTGT1 = .;
END;
ELSE DO;
R_NEWTGT0 = -P_NEWTGT0;
R_NEWTGT1 = -P_NEWTGT1;
SELECT( F_NEWTGT );
WHEN( '0' ) R_NEWTGT0 = R_NEWTGT0 +1;
WHEN( '1' ) R_NEWTGT1 = R_NEWTGT1 +1;
END;
END;
*********************************************************;
****** END OF DECISION TREE SCORING CODE ******;
*********************************************************;
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RUN

;

QUIT ;

/*-----------------------------------------------------*/
/*

ENTERPRISE MINER: END SCORE CODE

*/

/*-----------------------------------------------------*/

options nocenter pagesize=2000 linesize=80 nodate
nonumber;
proc sort data=&_predict;
by descending P_TGT1;
run;

A.2 The SAND Algorithm with Bootstrapping

The algorithm originally shown in Figure 5.1 is shown again in Figure A.3. Most of the
steps are similar to the original SAND algorithm; however, several steps (5, 9, 10, and 11) are
inserted to create the bootstrapped model from twenty or more sub-models.
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Figure A. 3. Sand Bootstrapping Algorithm

A.2.1 Bootstrap Loop

After we go through the initial steps towards creating the decision tree model, we enter a
continuous loop where we continually create new training data sets and eventually creating a
large model made up of twenty or more sub-models.
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These loops are beneficial since we were able to pick and choose the good models and
discard the not-so-good models. Then, we added the chosen models to become a sub-model
within our larger bootstrap-looped model.

A.2.2 Bootstrap results

The benefit of using bootstrapping is that it minimizes misclassification rates and it also
minimizes the effects of any remaining high misclassification rates.

Bootstrapping also

significantly lowered the false alarm rates as well as increased the hit rates.
A more automated system outside of the SAS environment where thousands of submodels would be created (instead of twenty) would likely produce a very close model of the
actual network. Further, when we separated and segregated our sub-models by attack type, the
number of false positives dropped dramatically, sometimes by 30-fold.
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